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Abstract:  This paper examines change on the economics research frontier, 
and asks whether the current competition between new research programmes 
may be supplanted by a new single dominant approach in the future. The 
paper discusses whether economics tends to be dominated by a single 
approach or reflect a pluralism of approaches, and argues that, historically, it 
has alternated between the two. It argues that orthodoxy usually emerges 
from heterodoxy, and interprets the division between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy in terms of a core–periphery distinction. Regarding recent 
economics, the paper maps out two different types of combinations of new 
research programmes as being synchronic or diachronic in nature. It treats 
the new research programmes as a new kind of heterodoxy, and asks how a 
new orthodoxy might arise out of this new heterodoxy and traditional 
heterodoxy. It discusses this question by advancing two views regarding how 
to different types of combinations in the new research programmes might 
consolidate along the lines of three shared commitments with traditional 
heterodoxy to form a new orthodoxy in economics. 
Keywords: Recent economics, Orthodoxy, Heterodoxy, Core–periphery 
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1. Introduction 
It has recently been argued that mainstream economics is in a 
process of transformation driven by the emergence of a collection of 
new research programmes over the last two decades all of which make 
important departures from standard neoclassical economics (Colander, 
2000; Colander et al., 2004; Davis, 2006). These new research 
programmes—including classical game theory, evolutionary game 
theory, behavioural game theory, evolutionary economics, behavioural 
economics, experimental economics, neuroeconomics and agent-based 
complexity economics—currently exhibit considerable heterogeneity, 
reflecting their separate origins primarily in different sciences outside 
economics and their pursuit by relatively distinct communities of 
researchers within economics. This development might consequently 
be taken as evidence that economics is becoming more pluralistic, 
perhaps under the impact of a ‘reverse imperialism’ (Frey and Benz, 
2004). But areas of overlap and shared concerns between these new 
approaches are becoming increasingly evident, creating the possibility 
of a new general research programme for economics that would 
abandon much of neoclassicism. Thus, the proliferation of new 
approaches in economics may reflect a transitional state of affairs, 
which may give way to new orthodoxy and a new mainstream in the 
future rather than a more pluralistic economics. This paper 
investigates how this new orthodoxy could develop, and how it could 
reconstitute the relationship between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in 
economics. 
This investigation, however, begins with a prior question, 
namely, whether economics should even be expected to develop a new 
orthodoxy, and thus produce a new division between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy. Why might economics not simply become more pluralistic 
for the indefinite future? While my own prescription for economics is 
that it ought to become more pluralistic and remain so, here I attempt 
to provide a description of the current trend of development in 
economics as I see it from the perspective of my reading of the history 
of economics. Accordingly Section 2 first argues that economics has 
historically tended to alternate between periods in which a single 
approach is dominant and periods in which there exist a pluralism of 
approaches, and thus that the field recurringly tends to structure itself 
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around dominant research programmes, which indeed also tend to 
break down, to subsequently be replaced by a pluralism of 
approaches, which then in turn give way again to dominant 
approaches. In order to lay a basis for examination of the current state 
of affairs in the mainstream, the discussion then proceeds to an 
analysis of why economics the former phase, or why economics tends 
to abandon periods of pluralism to structure itself around dominant 
programmes. Section 3 turns to the related issue of the nature of 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy in economics. I define these terms, argue 
that the relationship between orthodoxy and heterodoxy in economics 
is regularly reconstituted across the field's history, and also argue that 
orthodoxy usually emerges from heterodoxy. Following these 
arguments I represent the relationship between orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy in economics as a core–periphery relationship, and then 
give a taxonomy of heterodox approaches in terms of their respective 
origins and orientations. Section 4 then moves to the current state of 
affairs in mainstream economics, and maps out two different types of 
combinations of new research programmes characterised as either 
synchronic or diachronic in orientation. I argue that all the new 
mainstream research programmes maintain fundamental assumptions 
strictly at odds with neoclassical orthodoxy and more consonant with 
heterodoxy. Section 5 goes on to compare the new research 
programmes with traditional heterodox research programmes, and 
asks how a new orthodoxy might arise out of heterodoxy in general. 
Three shared commitments between the new programmes and 
traditional heterodoxy are identified as a potential basis for a new 
orthodoxy. Section 6 advances two views—one more conservative and 
one more transformational—regarding how the new research 
programmes might consolidate around their three shared 
commitments with traditional heterodoxy to form a new orthodoxy in 
economics. Section 7 closes with brief comments regarding economics' 
relative autonomy as a field. 
2. Dominance and pluralism in economics 
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully review the 
relationship between dominant approaches and pluralism in the history 
of economics, but consider the nature of five generally accepted 
periods of pluralism in economics: the transition from classical to 
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neoclassical economics in nineteenth-century Britain (Peart and Levy, 
2005); the Methodenstreit between the German Historical School and 
the early Austrians (Anderson et al., 1992); the multiple approaches to 
labour and monetary economics in post-Marshall Cambridge (Lawlor, 
2007); the interwar competition in the USA between institutional and 
neoclassical economics (Morgan and Rutherford, 1998); and the 1970s 
debate between proponents of monetary and fiscal policy in the ISLM 
framework (Young, 1987). In each case we find a that a pluralistic 
environment succeeded a period in which a single approach was 
dominant, and also find that this pluralistic environment later gave 
way to a new dominant approach. Neither pluralism nor dominance, 
then, appears to be a permanent state of affairs, and though each 
persists for periods of time, each is also ultimately replaced by the 
opposite state of affairs. It would be too simple to say that economics 
displays anything on the order of regular cycles of pluralism and 
dominance over its history, especially given the many interacting 
levels on which it (as any other subject) develops, but it might not be 
too much to argue that dominant research programmes create 
conditions for their subsequent fragmentation, whereas periods of 
pluralism create conditions for the re-emergence of new dominant 
approaches.1 This does not mean that it is always clear which state of 
affairs obtains. Within heterodox economics itself, the current state of 
affairs is clearly pluralistic, and yet some have recently argued there 
are a number of shared principles and commitments among the 
different heterodox approaches that might lay the basis for a single 
dominant conception of heterodoxy (Lawson, 2006; Lee, 2006). Within 
mainstream economics the situation is less clear, particularly given 
current neoclassical dominance of pedagogy, though the research 
frontier is clearly more heterogeneous than it was two decades ago, 
and debate has now also begun over possible components of a post-
neoclassical single mainstream approach in economics (Gintis, 2007).2 
Beyond the evidence that economics alternates between 
dominant approaches and pluralism, why else might we expect periods 
of pluralism to be succeeded by periods in which single approaches are 
dominant? One way to examine this question is to compare economics 
to its immediate neighbours—other social sciences—and here I draw 
on an extensive literature from the sociology of scientific knowledge 
regarding symbolic boundaries between sciences and academic 
disciplines that investigates how different sciences and disciplines rely 
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on different systems of internal organisation to promote their relative 
autonomy vis-à-vis one another.3 Thus, most social science fields, 
such as psychology, sociology, political science, and anthropology, are 
basically divided between what is internally seen as the conventional 
approach to the field and a collection of unconventional approaches, 
and professional legitimation in the field is strongly associated with 
pursuing the former. The stronger term ‘orthodox’, although used in 
economics, is not commonly associated with conventional approaches 
in other fields; nor is the term ‘heterodox’ as common elsewhere. But 
the literature as a whole generally argues that academic and 
professional disciplines recurringly structure themselves around 
dominant approaches on the grounds that this enables individuals 
within those fields to organise themselves in coherent (academic or 
professional) social groups, which then maintain themselves relative to 
similar (academic or professional) social groups that potentially may 
lay claim to their research domains. 
Why, then, does economics employ the stronger language of 
‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy?’ One line of argument in this general 
literature emphasises differences between fields' social policy 
exposure. In the domain of policy, fields must justify their value to the 
non-specialist public, whereas their internal constitution around the 
conventional/unconventional divide is a matter of structuring 
themselves to maintain their disciplinary boundaries (though the two 
defences are related). If we then classify sciences from a policy 
perspective as (i) high uncertainty and high stakes, (ii) high 
uncertainty and low stakes, (iii) low uncertainty and high stakes and 
(iv) low uncertainty and low stakes, because of the wide scope and 
profound impact of the market in modern society, and because 
economics' policy forecasts are often unreliable at both the micro and 
macro levels, economics falls into the first category of high uncertainty 
and high stakes. In effect, economics, might be considered an example 
of what has been called ‘post-normal’ science (contra Thomas Kuhn), 
where considerable uncertainty exists about the consequences of its 
policy application, there is weak consensus regarding the science's 
underlying values, and the stakes associated with policy error are high 
(Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1992; Ravetz, 1986; also cf. Reay, 2006). My 
claim, then, is that one important reason economics uses the language 
of ‘orthodoxy’ and ‘heterodoxy’ is that this provides a defence against 
the public criticism that is inevitable in high uncertainty, high stakes 
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circumstances. Essentially, the orthodoxy–heterodoxy distinction 
allows economics to claim economics is scientific by dismissing 
heterodoxy as unscientific. This requires that economics institutionalise 
visible discriminatory practices against heterodoxy (cf. Lee, 
forthcoming), though arguably not eliminate it entirely, since 
otherwise the identification of orthodoxy with science is not sustained. 
That is, eliminating heterodoxy eliminates orthodoxy. This enables 
economics to draw on the general esteem in which science is held in 
modern society to limit criticism of failed policy. Moreover, this defence 
is indirect in nature—and thus more subtle—because it avoids open 
promotion of orthodoxy by emphasising instead the policing of 
heterodoxy.4 
The need for economics to maintain its status as a science 
suggests yet another reason why we should expect periods of 
pluralism to be succeeded by periods in which single approaches are 
dominant that, in this instance, relies not on comparing economics to 
its close neighbours, other social sciences, but on comparing it to the 
highly regarded natural and physical sciences. I explain this in terms 
of two important respects in which economics differs from the natural 
and physical sciences. First, many of the latter employ controlled 
experiment to generate laboratory data to evaluate scientific 
hypotheses, whereas until quite recently economics has depended 
upon less reliable non-experimental field data for the empirical 
verification of theory. Second, while all sciences, including the 
experimental sciences, are value laden to some degree, value-
ladeness plays a significantly larger role in economics than it does in 
these other sciences by virtue of the closer proximity of economics to 
human interests. This latter difference, I suggest, is the more 
important one, since many would say that bias, such as that which 
value-ladeness can produce, is a worse problem than having to work 
with non-experimental field data. Indeed the natural and physical 
sciences that use non-experimental data are generally seen as less 
vulnerable to bias than economics. The implication of these two points, 
accordingly, is that, given the character of its empirical practice, 
economics first and foremost needs to minimise the appearance of 
value-ladeness to maintain its status as science. 
Note, then, that in a pluralistic economics differences in value 
assumptions between different approaches are readily apparent, 
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making the larger role value judgements play in economics as a whole 
more transparent. In contrast, when a dominant programme is in 
place, since it tends to be identified with the science as a whole, value 
judgements are more likely to be taken for granted and, as a result, 
are less frequently articulated. Thus, the main problem associated with 
seeing economics as a science vis-à-vis natural and physical science 
disappears from view. At the same time, an absence of pluralism also 
reduces debate about empirical practice, so that economics' 
differences with natural and physical science also attract less 
attention. Indeed the issue of economics' standing as a science has 
recently become more prominent with the rise of experimental 
economics, and repeated pronouncements of experimentalists and 
many others that economics' long history as a largely a priori 
deductive science exhibits questionable scientific credentials (e.g. 
Samuelson, 2005; Smith, 1989, 1994). Thus, altogether pluralism 
generates doubts about economics' standing as a science, whereas 
dominant approaches tend to reduce these doubts. 
For these reasons, then, pluralism in economics tends to give 
way to dominant approaches, even if those dominant approaches 
ultimately later give way again to pluralism. Consequently, despite an 
increasing pluralism on the mainstream economics research frontier, 
the subject's history and its relative standing as a scientific discipline 
among other disciplines give us good reason to anticipate the 
formation of a new dominant approach. It is important to emphasise, 
however, that across the history of economics succeeding dominant 
approaches have had surprisingly little resemblance to each other. 
That is, the dominant approach that follows a period of pluralism 
seems to little resemble the dominant approach that preceded that 
period of pluralism. For example, classical economics was preceded by 
physiocracy and mercantilism, and succeeded by neoclassicism. 
Although there exist continuities between all three, most historians 
would agree that they represent fundamentally different approaches. I 
suggest that in the history of economics, then, the non-replication of 
dominant approaches generally holds true. Thus, the possible 
emergence of a new dominant approach in mainstream economics is 
more likely than not to be substantially different from neoclassical 
economics. Two further reasons to expect this are that all the new 
research programmes in economics have their origins primarily in 
other sciences, and thus import new assumptions and concepts into 
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economics, and all challenge fundamental assumptions in 
neoclassicism.6 However, before turning to what consolidations 
between these new approaches might emerge, the following section 
addresses the nature of the orthodox–heterodox divide in current 
economics. 
3. The orthodox–heterodox divide in economics 
The terms ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’ have been used in a 
variety ways in economics, but in the discussion above they are 
treated as sociological terms that define what is generally regarded as 
conventional or unconventional in the economics.7 There are two 
important implications of this interpretation. First, neither ‘orthodox’ 
nor ‘heterodox’ inherently refers to any particular type of approach in 
economics; alternatively, any kind of approach in economics can be 
orthodox or heterodox depending on historical conditions, and indeed 
in the history of economics most major approaches have been both at 
one time or another, and not infrequently both at the same time, 
though in different locations.8 Second, though there has often been a 
close correlation between individual economists' professional success 
and their association with conventional approaches, this has tended to 
be more (though not exclusively) the case when a dominant approach 
exists, whereas in periods of pluralism, when what is conventional is 
unclear or under challenge, many individuals can be quite successful 
professionally though their approaches are still unconventional. For 
example, today both behavioural and experimental economics are not 
conventional, though many of their main contributors are very 
successful professionally, as evidenced by the Nobel prizes awarded to 
Daniel Kahneman and Vernon Smith. This creates problems for 
explanations of the orthodox–heterodox divide in economics, since the 
term ‘mainstream’ is both typically applied to those who are 
professionally successful, and is also equated with the term ‘orthodox.’ 
The professional success of many behavioural and experimental 
economists tells us that the first meaning ought to be retained, but the 
fact that these approaches are not conventional tells us that the 
second meaning should not. 
However, this creates a further problem for the interpretation of 
the terms ‘orthodox’ and ‘heterodox’, namely, if approaches such as 
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behavioural and experimental economics are mainstream yet not 
conventional, are they heterodox? Many orthodox and heterodox 
economists would no doubt deny they are, because they associate 
heterodoxy strictly with being outside the mainstream. Note, however, 
that two of the new approaches in the mainstream, behavioural and 
evolutionary economics are also established heterodox approaches 
and, more recently, heterodox economists have begun to make use of 
complexity theory. We might still reserve the term non-conventional 
for the new approaches, but I will argue in the next section that the 
new approaches all maintain fundamental assumptions at odds with 
neoclassical orthodoxy, and thus should be seen as heterodox. This 
would then imply that current heterodoxy juxtaposes approaches 
many see as quite different, but should this seem an objection, we 
might note that in the history of economics heterodoxy has often been 
highly heterogeneous. Indeed, historically, heterodoxy in economics 
has been more a big tent affair with a variety of disparate approaches 
usually having few links to one another rather than having been an 
organised opposition to orthodoxy, as is associated with the 
contemporary International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism 
in Economics (ICAPE). Perhaps the most accurate label, then, is 
‘mainstream heterodox’, as odd as this may sound. Some prefer to 
emphasise ‘dissent’ as a better label (Backhouse, 2004; Holt and 
Pressman, 1998), but dissent suggests disagreement within a shared 
framework, and I take the differences between the new approaches in 
the mainstream and neoclassicism to be both more radical and indeed 
close to many positions that traditional heterodoxy has critically 
advanced against neoclassicism. The next section thus provides a 
defence of the ‘mainstream heterodox’ label in terms of these 
positions, and then Section 5 turns to the issue of what this all implies 
about the relationship between existing heterodoxy and mainstream 
heterodoxy. 
Returning, however, to the historical relationship between 
orthodoxy and heterodoxy, I claim that orthodoxy ultimately always 
emerges from heterodoxy (cf. Coats, 1999). New dominant 
approaches emerge from periods of pluralism that are preceded by 
periods with earlier orthodox–heterodox divides. As dominant 
approaches have not historically replicated themselves across periods 
of pluralism, new dominant approaches must have their origins in 
heterodoxy. How, then, might current heterodoxy produce a future 
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orthodoxy? To investigate this question, the balance of this section 
distinguishes between different heterodox approaches in terms of their 
different origins and orientations, and frames this all in terms of a 
core–periphery characterisation of the orthodox–heterodox divide. 
As befits the postwar period of neoclassical dominance, much 
thinking about existing heterodoxy is strongly associated with 
understanding its relation to neoclassicism, and this common 
opposition suggests that these different approaches have similar 
origins and orientations. But just as the history of economics shows 
that orthodoxy arises in different ways, it also shows that different 
approaches become heterodox in different ways. Further, as some 
heterodox approaches ultimately become orthodox and others do not, 
their respective orientations toward orthodoxy should be expected to 
differ as well. Focusing first on the origins side of the story, I 
distinguish four different ways in which heterodox approaches arise 
relative to changes in orthodoxy. Heterodoxy arises because of:That 
is, different heterodox research programmes have what might be 
called different ‘origin stories’, where these stories tell how particular 
research programmes acquire the status of being heterodox. Though 
there is considerable room for debate, among the approaches 
customarily seen to be heterodox I provisionally suggest that the 
Veblenian evolutionary–institutional approach be seen as an example 
of (1), post-Keynesianism as the inheritor of J. M. Keynes' economics 
be seen as an example of (2), the neo-Ricardian approach as reflects 
Piero Sraffa's thinking be seen as an example of (3), and early feminist 
economics that engaged the work of Gary Becker be seen as an 
example of (4).9 
(1) Failure to become orthodox following a period of pluralism. 
(2) Loss of the status of orthodox when a new orthodoxy 
emerges. 
(3) Failure to redirect orthodoxy from outside orthodoxy. 
(4) Failure to redirect orthodoxy from inside orthodoxy. 
To place these origin stories in a larger framework, let us represent 
the relationship between orthodox and heterodox approaches in 
economics as a core–periphery relationship, where the field's core 
principles and concepts are defined as orthodox and also suppress 
reference to periphery principles, while the field's heterodox periphery 
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is defined in terms of principles and concepts explicitly seen to lie 
outside the core and yet which also bear some relationship to the 
boundaries of the field as a whole. For example, a core principle in 
orthodox neoclassical economics is that individual behaviour is 
rational, and a common defense of the principle is that ‘it could not be 
otherwise’ (thus suppressing reference to other forms of 
conceptualisation). In contrast, a periphery principle in traditional 
Marxist economics is that individual behaviour reflects class location. 
The Marxist explanation is heterodox in virtue of explicitly lying outside 
the core of the field, but the concept of class also bears a relation to 
the boundaries of economics in light of its important role in sociology. 
Two comments on this framework are worth noting. First, though the 
core–periphery distinction can be used to distinguish orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy, since nothing in the history of economics is intrinsically 
orthodox or heterodox, core and periphery principles and concepts can 
and have exchanged places in the history of economics. Second, it can 
also be argued that, as the sciences are relatively distinct from one 
another, over often considerable periods of time, certain principles 
tend to remain core principles across changes in dominant approaches, 
even when these arise out of heterodoxy (despite considerable change 
regarding what else is orthodox). For example, it might be argued that 
the concept of equilibrium is a core principle in economics, and that 
challenges to this principle risk breaking down the boundaries of 
economics as a relatively autonomous discipline. I return to this point 
briefly in the last section. 
In addition to different heterodox approaches' origin stories, then, 
consider now their different possible orientations. Whereas orthodox 
approaches are essentially inward-looking, and generally suppress 
reference to heterodox programmes within their own conceptualisation 
(if not in their self-defence as science), heterodox approaches can 
orient more or less toward the field's core or toward the boundaries of 
economics and other sciences beyond its periphery. Combining these 
two orientation possibilities with the four different origin stories gives a 
roughly eight-fold classification of heterodox approaches. Again, of 
course, classifying any particular individual heterodox approach as one 
of these eight cases cannot but be controversial. And individual 
heterodox approaches also exhibit considerable heterogeneity allowing 
multiple interpretations. As illustrations, however, I suggest examples 
of two polar cases. 
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One extreme is an approach that originates as orthodox, but upon 
becoming heterodox—origin story (2)—turns away from the new 
orthodoxy to incorporate principles from other sciences, thus, in effect, 
continually moving from the centre outwards. Post-Keynesian 
economics, for example, might be considered formerly orthodox (as 
Keynes's economics before ISLM) and is now heterodox, but, as 
fundamentally concerned with path-dependency and strong 
uncertainty, concepts with currently a greater role outside of 
economics in evolutionary biology and history, could be characterised 
as oriented outwards toward the boundaries of economics. Or, to take 
the opposite extreme, there are what I regard as heterodox 
approaches in economics that originate in other sciences, that is, 
beyond the field's periphery, and then orient inwards toward the core 
of economics in an attempt to redirect it, though remaining heterodox 
unless successful—origin story (3). Current behavioural economics 
with its origins in psychology and its primary focus as the critique of 
rational choice has an orientation toward the core of economics and 
thus seems to be an example of this case. 
Whether these classifications are accepted or rejected, I argue that 
different heterodox approaches can generally be distinguished and 
characterised according to their respective combinations of different 
origin stories and primary orientations. What, then, does this imply 
about current heterodoxy, broadly understood? I claim that all the new 
mainstream research programmes in economics (evolutionary 
economics may be an exception) are generally, like behavioural 
economics, examples of the second extreme above. They all originate 
outside of economics and are mostly oriented toward redirecting the 
core of economics. That is, their agenda is to revise the existing core 
principles in the discipline. The situation is more mixed, however, with 
those approaches usually recognised as heterodox. Some are oriented 
toward the field's core, but most, I believe, are oriented more towards 
the field's boundaries, with the project of broadening or transforming 
economics as a whole by challenging its boundaries. Consider, for 
example, the theory of choice as a core doctrine. Behavioural 
economists think the theory of choice in economics is wrong, but 
rather than abandon the theory of choice altogether, they want to 
revise it. Most heterodox economists, however, simply believe the 
theory of choice should be abandoned for non-individualistic 
conceptualisations of the economic process that have more in common 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol 32, No. 3 (May 2008): pg. 349-366. DOI. This article is © Oxford University Press and 
permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Oxford University Press does not 
grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission 
from Oxford University Press. 
13 
 
with other social sciences. My point here is not that one approach is 
better or worse than the other, but that the orientations are different, 
and this may have significant implications for how economics changes 
in the future, and a new orthodoxy (and heterodoxy) develops. 
4. Synchronic and diachronic research 
programmes in recent mainstream economics 
I treat the new research programmes in mainstream economics 
as largely synchronic or diachronic. Synchronic types of explanations 
can be defined as those that emphasise the interrelation of particular 
kinds of phenomena within limited time frames, and diachronic types 
of explanations can be defined as those that emphasise how 
phenomena undergo a process of change through time. I do not refer 
to these two types of explanations as static and dynamic for three 
reasons. First, to do so would be to assume that these new 
programmes replicate that same distinction, whereas the history of 
economics appears to show that this distinction applies specifically to 
the period in which neoclassical economics is dominant rather than 
across the history of economics. Second, standard static explanations 
are general explanations of abstract agents framed mathematically, 
whereas those approaches I treat as synchronic are ideal-type 
scenario-driven accounts of particular processes governing the 
interaction of interdependent agents explicated with a variety of 
modelling strategies. Similarly, the standard view of dynamics is that it 
involves investigation of mathematical models that are recursive and 
deterministic, while the approaches I treat as diachronic explicitly 
model evolution and change. Third, the static–dynamic distinction does 
not align nicely with the synchronic–diachronic distinction. For 
example, game theory, which might be thought of as a 
characteristically static form of explanation, has one-off games, finitely 
repeated games, indefinitely repeated games and evolutionary games 
(cf. Hargreaves Heap and Varoufakis, 2004), whereas agent-based 
complexity economics, which might be thought of as a 
characteristically dynamic form of explanation, is populated with 
simulation models that set up initial conditions that are allowed to run 
out to sets of determinate (if often unexpected) results (e.g. Kirman, 
2001; Tesfatsion, 2001). Indeed, my view is that the synchronic–
diachronic distinction, while reasonably adequate as a means of 
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classifying the new research programmes today, will stand up less well 
as these programmes increasingly converge and draw upon one 
another in the future. 
The research programmes employing primarily synchronic forms 
of explanation (and some leading figures), then, are classical game 
theory (John Nash, Robert Aumann, John Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten 
and Ariel Rubinstein), behavioural game theory (Colin Camerer, Ernst 
Fehr, Werner Guth and Matthew Rabin), behavioural economics 
(Herbert Simon, Amos Tversky, Daniel Kahneman, Richard Thaler, 
George Loewenstein, Colin Camerer, Jon Elster and Gerd Gigerenzer), 
experimental economics (Vernon Smith, Selten, David Grether, 
Charles Plott) and neuroeconomics (Paul Glimcher, Colin Camerer, Paul 
Zak and Kevin McCabe). The research programmes employing 
primarily diachronic forms of explanation (and some leading figures) 
are evolutionary game theory (Thomas Schelling, Robert Axelrod, John 
Maynard Smith, Ken Binmore and Larry Samuelson), evolutionary 
economics (Paul David, H. Peyton Young and Douglas North) and 
agent-based complexity economics (Herbert Simon, Thomas Schelling, 
John Holland, Brian Arthur, Douglas North, Steve Durlauf, Alan 
Kirman, Paul Krugman and Leigh Tesfatsion). 
Note that some of these ‘new’ programmes had antecedents in 
the postwar period that failed to command a significant following, for 
example, game theory immediately after the war (cf. Mirowski, 2002) 
and the behavioural economics of Simon and colleagues (cf. Sent, 
2004). In addition, some of the individuals mentioned above were 
active in these new approaches well before they became recognised in 
the last two decades as identifiable research programmes (e.g. the 
earlier work of Smith and Schelling). Also, note that the boundaries 
between the approaches are not always sharp, as reflected in some 
individuals' involvement in more than one approach. Finally, although 
these approaches are all new to the mainstream, in varying degrees 
they all have antecedents in existing heterodox research programmes, 
which in some instances go back many years. Indeed, this link, 
generally unacknowledged from both sides, is central to the argument 
of this paper. 
Three of the synchronic programmes, then, classical game 
theory, experimental economics and behavioural game theory, are 
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accounts of agent interaction, whereas two others, behavioural 
economics per se and neuroeconomics, provide theoretical and 
empirical foundations for these accounts. All investigate different types 
of ideal-type scenarios, basically different kinds of games or different 
auction forms or trading systems (cf. Friedman and Cassar, 2004; 
Heinrich et al., 2004), in which individuals interact in particular 
contexts rather than simply solve general parameterised Walrasian 
optimisation problems (cf. Colander, 1996). Individuals may be self-
regarding, other-regarding (Gintis, 2007) and act on the basis of a 
variety of norms, ethical and otherwise, which may have social or 
anthropological bases (Camerer and Fehr, 2004). They exhibit a 
variety of types of behaviour other than optimisation, are boundedly 
rational and weak of will in various ways, and have preferences that 
are endogenous in varying degrees, the main debate being whether 
preferences are constructed (Cubitt et al., 2001) or discovered (Plott, 
1996), not whether preferences are exogenous. There is considerable 
ambivalence and outright doubts about laissez faire and the idea that 
markets are natural with interventionist calls for ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ (Sunstein and Thaler, 2003), and the issue of how to 
construct markets or market design has moved to the forefront of 
policy (cf. Guala, 2001; Nik-Khah, 2006). 
Behavioural economics (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein, 2003; 
Kahneman, 2003; Starmer, 2000) and neuroeconomics (Camerer et 
al., 2005) offer theories of the foundations of agent behaviour. In 
both, the axiomatic rationality analysis of neoclassicism is rejected, in 
the former in light of evidence from psychology and in the latter in 
light of evidence from neuroscience. Relatedly, though classical game 
theory treats individuals as rational, the rather mixed success of the 
equilibrium refinements programme meant to limit the possible Nash 
equilibria in games (cf. Rizvi, 1994) casts doubt on the degree to 
which individuals in games can indeed be seen as rational. In contrast, 
behavioural game theory, arguably now the main avenue forward for 
game theory, investigates individual behaviour in games empirically 
rather than simply assume it to be rational (Camerer, 2003). Game 
theory in general, moreover, rejects neoclassicism's benchmark 
competitive model of indirect interaction solely through the price 
mechanism to focus on scenario-driven direct interaction. 
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In terms of the core–periphery analysis of orthodox and 
heterodox from the last section, then, these approaches all exhibit 
both origin story (3), by virtue of the fact that their concepts, 
principles and theoretical strategies originate in other sciences, and as 
described above are also all oriented inward, by virtue of their focus on 
challenging core neoclassical assumptions and commitments. 
Experimentalism, of course, did not exist in economics, except in rare 
instances, until relatively recently and, by its nature, it contests the a 
priori form of theorizing characteristic of neoclassicism. 
Experimentalism, however, is fundamental in most other sciences. 
Behavioural economics and neuroeconomics, as noted, originate in 
psychology and neuroscience, respectively. Game theory was 
developed initially in mathematics, and intentionally exported to 
economics for the purpose of transforming it (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1944). Combined, these different programmes offer an 
alternative substantive account of individual behaviour as interactive 
as well as alternative methodologies and methods of investigation. 
The new synchronic approaches, then, all maintain fundamental 
assumptions at odds with neoclassical orthodoxy. What about the 
diachronic programmes? The three diachronic forms of explanation—
evolutionary game theory, evolutionary economics and agent-based 
complexity economics—have even less in common with neoclassicism. 
Most importantly, whereas the latter employs dynamic models with 
given agents on deterministic time paths, the new programmes use a 
biology-based type of modelling with evolving environments in which 
agents and their relationships change. Evolutionary game theory, the 
most mathematical (thus perhaps thought the closest to 
neoclassicism), abandons individuals and methodological individualism 
altogether to focus on population shares of types of agents or kinds of 
strategies (cf. Samuelson, 2002). As in classical game theory, agents 
interact directly in specific contexts, but their interaction can be 
transformed by the emergence of unforeseeable strategies and 
‘mutant’ agents. In non-game theoretic evolutionary approaches, 
institutional structures condition and are generated by lock-in, network 
externalities and path dependence (David, 1985, 2005; North, 2004). 
Complexity approaches employ bounded rationality and coevolving 
expectations of heterogeneous agents to explore different systems of 
agent interaction (Arthur et al., 1997). All of this is incompatible with 
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the neoclassical static conception of atomistic individuals with 
exogenous preferences. 
These diachronic approaches also exhibit origin story (3), 
particularly in light of the strong influence of biological reasoning and, 
in the case of complexity approaches, additional influences from 
physical science and cognitive science (Clark, 1997; Holland, 1995). 
Essentially these programmes all have their origins outside of 
economics. The situation with respect to orientation, however, is not 
as clear as it is with respect to the new synchronic research 
programmes. While the intention to substitute direct interaction for 
indirect Walrasian interaction and general recourse to bounded choice 
indicates a focus on changing economics' core, evolutionary reasoning 
itself has little basis in neoclassicism,10 and thus arguably these 
diachronic programmes are more concerned with expanding the 
boundaries of economics and are thus oriented toward the periphery of 
economics. I return to this issue below, in Section 6, where I address 
two possible scenarios for the consolidation of economics around a 
new orthodoxy. But in Section 5 I first discuss the relationship 
between the new mainstream heterodoxy and traditional heterodoxy. 
5. Mainstream heterodoxy and traditional 
heterodoxy 
The general argument advanced here is that orthodoxy emerges 
from heterodoxy. But this includes the possibility that a future 
orthodoxy in economics might emerge from a combination of 
heterodox approaches, thus inviting us to address the relationship 
between the new mainstream heterodoxy and traditional heterodoxy. 
The main traditional heterodox programmes are generally said to be: 
(old) institutional economics, Marxist economics (and radical 
economics), post-Keynesian economics, neo-Ricardian economics, 
social economics and socio-economics, Austrian economics, feminist 
economics, critical realism, and post-modernist economics.11 In terms 
of the sociology of economics, there seem to be five important 
differences between these and other traditional heterodox groups and 
the new mainstream approaches. 
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One difference between them is that the traditional programmes 
have become heterodox in different ways or have different origin 
stories, while the new programmes are all heterodox in virtue of their 
recent emergence in economics from locations outside the field. A 
second difference is that many of the former tend to be oriented 
toward the periphery of economics as reflected in a rejection of core 
orthodox principles rather than pursuit of their reform, combined with 
an advocacy of alternative foundations for economics based on closer 
ties to, and less sharp boundaries with, sociology, history, politics and 
anthropology. There are important exceptions to this judgement (for 
example, neo-Ricardian economics), but I believe it is shared by most 
of the recent commentators on traditional heterodoxy (e.g. Backhouse, 
2000; Dow, 2000; Lawson, 2006; Lee, 2006). A third difference, as 
noted above, is that mainstream heterodoxy enjoys the professional 
advantages of the mainstream. A fourth difference concerns attitudes 
toward dominance and pluralism in economics. Whereas most 
traditional heterodox economists reject the idea that economics should 
have a dominant programme, and embrace the idea that economics 
should be pluralistic,12 most mainstream heterodox economists—as 
reflects their mainstream professional location and their orientation on 
the field's core—accept the idea that economics tends to be dominated 
by single approaches. A fifth difference concerns attitudes toward 
methods and methodological practice, specifically formal modelling and 
positivism. Indeed, while some see this as a fundamental dividing line 
between orthodoxy and heterodoxy (e.g., Backhouse, 2000; Lawson, 
1997), most individuals in the new mainstream approaches see the 
issue as a matter of which more or less formal methods are best 
rather than whether such methods play too large a role in economics. 
Given these differences, if sociological factors were to prevail, 
prima facie it seems more likely that future orthodoxy in economics 
will result from a combination of the new mainstream research 
programmes rather than a combination of those and traditional 
heterodox approaches (much less the latter alone). Reinforcing this 
conclusion is the very limited communication between proponents of 
the new and traditional heterodox research programmes (though 
recently there have been links from both sides between those 
favouring behavioural, complexity and evolutionary approaches). 
Despite this, we might also place weight on the fact that the new 
mainstream approaches reject many of the fundamental doctrinal 
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assumptions of neoclassicism, and ask whether possible agreement 
over the content of economics might generate greater congruence 
between the new and traditional heterodox research programmes than 
sociological factors suggest. To investigate this possibility, I identify 
three substantive principles, which I suggest characterise the main 
concerns of most of traditional heterodoxy and constitute critiques of 
neoclassicism (cf. Davis, 2007), and ask what roles they play in the 
new mainstream approaches. These three principles are:Each of these 
principles operates in the new mainstream approaches taken as a set, 
but, it should be emphasised, each does not operate in each and every 
one of those approaches. Thus, whether an alignment between the 
new approaches and traditional heterodoxy may possibly emerge in 
the future to produce a new orthodoxy in economics seems to depend 
in good part on how these principles come to be embraced across the 
new mainstream heterodoxy as a whole. I turn, then, to two possible 
pathways by which this might occur. 
1. Individuals are socially embedded rather than atomistic. 
2. Processes are evolutionary rather than mechanical. 
3. Individuals and social-economic structures are mutually 
influencing. 
6. Two pathways to a new orthodoxy 
Distinguishing the synchronic and diachronic research 
programmes, the five synchronic research programmes appear to be 
primarily concerned with the first and third issues above, whereas the 
three diachronic research programmes appear to be primarily 
concerned with the second and third issues. Regarding the shared 
third issue, while it is not difficult to see that diachronic approaches 
emphasising evolution and change have as a fundamental assumption 
that individuals and social-economic structures are mutually 
influencing, perhaps it is less obvious with respect to the synchronic 
approaches. But to take the two 2002 Nobel prize winners as 
representative, the idea is indeed fundamental to the Kahneman's 
bounded rationality framing argument in the simple idea that context 
influences choice (Kahneman, 2003) and to experimentalist Vernon 
Smith's ‘environment–institutions–behaviour’ triad and slogan that 
‘institutions matter’ (Smith, 1989). Indeed both behaviouralists and 
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experimentalists generally accept the idea of a two-way street 
between individual behaviour and social-economic structures, and 
have recently found further common ground in behavioural game 
theory's cross-cultural experimental examination of how social rules 
and choices in different societies interact (Heinrich et al., 2004). It is 
not to be denied that, in comparison with traditional heterodoxy, this 
principle operates in a more formal and positivistic manner. But it is 
important to recognise that the substantive position itself is the same 
as that in traditional heterodoxy. Or, to put matters critically, both the 
new mainstream approaches and traditional heterodoxy reject the 
neoclassical one-way street microfoundations view. 
While the three diachronic programmes are primarily concerned 
with the second and third issues, they hardly regard individuals as 
atomistic, as reflected in the idea that individuals and social structures 
are mutually influencing. But the status of individuals seems to be a 
secondary focus in these programmes, with greater attention being 
devoted to the interaction of different kinds of agents in evolutionary 
processes.13 Thus, the two kinds of new mainstream approaches 
specialize, as it were, on the first and second principles above, while 
sharing the third. That is, synchronic approaches take individuals to be 
socially embedded rather than atomistic, and largely ignore the issue 
of whether economic processes are evolutionary, while diachronic 
approaches do the reverse. 
On the basis of this difference, I map out two pathways—one 
more conservative and one more transformational—regarding how a 
new future orthodoxy might arise in economics. The two pathways are 
differentiated according to the degree of departure they make from 
current neoclassical orthodoxy. The main difference between them 
concerns the weight given to the new diachronic programmes' 
specialisation and primary concern with processes of change. Current 
neoclassical orthodoxy exhibits almost no concern with genuine 
processes of change. A new conservative orthodoxy, then, would 
essentially emphasise the two commitments of the synchronic 
programmes, and de-emphasise the primary commitment of the 
diachronic programmes. On the other hand, a new transformational 
orthodoxy would combine all three commitments and make a more 
significant departure from neoclassicism in seeing the economic 
process as evolutionary. Further, on the transformational pathway, the 
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combination of all three commitments in a single programme would 
presumably produce a stronger interpretation of the two principles 
specific to the synchronic programmes. 
Specifically, consider the kinds of commitments a new 
orthodoxy might make to principles one and three on the more 
conservative view. Regarding the first principle, while individuals 
could, in principle, still be seen to be ‘socially’ embedded, this would 
be true in only the most abstract sense were it not framed by some 
account of how individuals' social embeddedness reflected a changing 
economic environment. For example, behavioural economics treats 
individuals as ‘socially’ embedded rather than atomistic via its 
heuristics of choice critique of standard theory's independence axiom, 
but this only takes us as far as the simple idea that the context of 
choice matters. Regarding the third principle, individuals and social-
economic structures can still be seen to be mutually influencing, but 
the idea of social-economic structures could again be highly abstract 
and formal. For example, the commitment that the experimental 
economics of Vernon Smith and others makes to the mutual influence 
idea—‘institutions matter’—essentially compares the designs of 
different alternative market institutions in their effects on choice from 
the perspective of the expert, and tells us little about how the two-way 
street relationship between institutions and individuals actually works 
in an historical world governed by change.14 
A new orthodoxy, then, could distinguish itself from neoclassical 
orthodoxy by its mild adoption of principles one and three and general 
neglect of principle two, and thus remain conservative in terms of the 
limited departure this would make from the current standard view. It 
could then be argued that this limited departure a new synchronic-
based orthodoxy would make from neoclassicism does not 
substantially change the nature of economics (though it would involve 
a genuine departure from neoclassical rational choice microfoundations 
thinking), since economics would still be largely about choice, albeit as 
set out in a collection of ideal-type interactive contexts. One might 
hope that the continual introduction of new concepts in experimental 
and behavioural game theory increasingly at odds with old neoclassical 
ones (e.g. various concepts of cognitive processing) might put the 
process of change in economics on a slippery slope leading to a future 
economics of interactive individual behaviour quite different in nature, 
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but it seems more reasonable to say that the only guarantee that this 
would occur lies in there being some explicit commitment to 
evolutionary theorising. 
How, then, are we to understand what emerges as heterodoxy 
on these two views? On the more conservative view, heterodoxy is 
occupied by neoclassicism, the new diachronic approaches and those 
traditional heterodox approaches most associated with evolutionary 
reasoning. On the transformational view, heterodoxy is occupied by 
neoclassicism, not by the new diachronic approaches nor by any of the 
traditional heterodox approaches. Indeed, on the transformational 
view, all three dividing lines between current orthodoxy and 
heterodoxy are erased, leaving neoclassicism alone in the periphery of 
economics. This is certainly not to say that differences would not 
remain between the new research programmes and traditional 
heterodoxy, particularly with respect to formalism and positivism. But 
I suggest that these differences would rather be grounds for dissent 
and disagreement within a new orthodoxy. They could, however, still 
produce inequities in professional advantages. 
The interesting question remaining, consequently, concerns 
whether traditional heterodoxy might influence the process of change 
in economics, particularly whether the future pathway is conservative 
or transformational. Two considerations seem relevant. First, most 
traditional heterodox economists deny they share any common ground 
with the new research approaches in economics. Indeed, if one 
surveys what is published in most traditional heterodox journals, there 
seems to be limited interest, familiarity and understanding of what 
these new approaches involve. This stance, on the surface, would 
seem to make the conservative pathway more likely. Against this, 
more recently a not insignificant number of heterodox economists 
have become knowledgeable and interested in the new programmes, 
especially the diachronic ones, where evolutionary and complexity 
reasoning draw on traditional heterodox commitments, but also in the 
behavioural and experimental programmes, as they connect to a long-
standing interest in bounded rationality. Second, many traditional 
heterodox approaches, I believe it can be argued, have adopted an 
orientation toward the periphery of economics on the grounds that 
economics needs to be changed through adoption of concepts and 
principles from other disciplines and social sciences. While I am 
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strongly sympathetic to this view of the need for a far-reaching 
transformation of economics, if these are not the grounds on which 
economics is in fact changing, then this stance would also make the 
conservative pathway more likely. 
What does this all recommend, then, to traditional heterodox 
economists? If the argument above is correct regarding the three 
principles as the common ground of current heterodoxy, then 
traditional heterodox economists should actively engage with research 
in the new programmes where its implications advances these 
principles. This, of course, does not mean supporting everything in the 
new programmes (indeed old neoclassical commitments and training 
still influence the new research, if decreasingly so) and, furthermore, 
the new programmes certainly ignore many important concerns in 
traditional heterodoxy, so that emphasis needs always to lie on shared 
ground. But if engagement with the new programmes on this basis is 
possible, then perhaps it would help make these principles more 
explicit and central to those programmes. Moreover, since on the 
transformational view of the future of economics the new diachronic 
programmes play a key role in contesting neoclassicism, engagement 
with these programmes in particular offers an important opportunity to 
increase their relative influence. Traditional heterodoxy, then, seems 
to have important cards to play. 
7. Economics as a separate science 
Economics has long seen itself since itself as a relatively 
autonomous science with its own distinctive set of characteristics that 
make it a ‘separate’ science (Hausman, 1992). But given that all the 
new programmes on the research frontier have their origins in other 
sciences, and import new conceptual contents from outside economics 
into the field, the status of economics' boundaries and separateness 
from other fields has become a very real issue. At the same time, 
economics, as other sciences, has regularly imported other science 
contents in the past, and having subsequently ‘domesticated’ them, 
remade itself still as economics. In the current situation, for example, 
behavioural economics—a research programme in economics, not in 
psychology—employs imports from psychology but frames them in 
terms of economic concerns. Thus, though, historically, sciences do 
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sometimes largely pass out of existence, nonetheless there seems to 
be considerable stability in the long term array of the different 
sciences (augmented by the rise of new ones) giving us reason to 
rather believe that from time to time they remodel themselves at least 
in some degree in the image of other sciences while sustaining their 
relatively distinctive concerns. If economics, then, remade itself in the 
image of physics at the turn of the last century (Mirowski, 1989), it 
may now be remaking itself at the turn of this one in the image of 
psychology and biology, as reflected in the impetus these fields, 
respectively, give to the new synchronic and diachronic programmes in 
economics. 
Such a change could be profound and far-reaching, as casual 
reflection on the difference between modelling social science 
relationships on physical ones versus natural ones readily suggests. In 
the current short term, however, this still leaves open what economics' 
distinctive concerns and indeed its own definition might come to be. 
Thus, those traditional heterodox research programmes oriented 
towards economics' boundaries rather than towards its core seem to 
have one special advantage in a time when the influence of other 
sciences on economics is strong, since they tend to focus on issues 
concerning the nature of the field as a whole, which can be neglected 
by those programmes more dedicated to working out the details of the 
critique of core orthodoxy. This suggests that a future orthodoxy 
emergent from current heterodoxy may draw differentially from 
heterodox research programmes of different orientations based on a 
division of labour between them. But as the engagement between the 
new research programmes and traditional heterodox programmes is 
still quite limited, I leave these issues to future consideration. 
The author is also grateful to those attending presentations of 
the paper at the 2006 History of Economics Society Annual Meeting, 
the 2007 International Confederation of Associations for Pluralism in 
Economics Conference, and the 2007 History of Recent Economics 
Conference. 
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1I do not investigate the fragmentation of dominant approaches and te 
rise of pluralism here, because my focus is on possible 
convergences in the new research approaches in economics. 
However, three perhaps complementary theories about why the 
postwar dominance of the neoclassical research programme has 
generated conditions for the rise of the new research 
programmes in economics are summarised in Davis (2006). 
2This paper was widely circulated before publication, and is published 
with a collection of commentaries. 
3Though the sociological concept of symbolic boundaries dates back to 
the nineteenth century, its application in research on the nature 
of academic disciplines and the professions dates from the 
1980s and in-group versus out-group social identity analysis as 
developed by Tajfel and Turner (1971). Lamont and Molnár 
(2002) provide a recent, comprehensive survey of this 
literature. Influential contributions include those of Abbott 
(1988), Bourdieu (1988), Bowker and Starr (1999), Collins 
(1998), and especially (Gieryn 1983, 1993, 1999). 
4An alternative, more enlightened, direct form of defence of economic 
policy would be for economics to join other sciences and 
disciplines in adopting a professional code of ethics (DeMartino, 
2005). 
6For example, all appear to work with alternatives to the atomistic 
individual conception, a foundational assumption in neoclassical 
economics (cf. Davis, 2008). 
7Here I largely agree with Colander (2003A, 2003B). 
8Thus from 1950 to 1990 neoclassical economics was orthodox in 
capitalist economies and heterodox in socialist economies, while 
Marxist economics was orthodox in socialist economies and 
heterodox in capitalist economies. 
9See Davis and Sent (2006) for fuller discussion of heterodox origin 
stories. 
10There is a Chicago School tradition in evolutionary thinking, but its 
focus is on an ‘as if’ justification of rational behaviour in the 
form of an outcome of a past evolutionary process, whereas the 
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new evolutionary programmes are focused on evolutionary 
systems themselves. 
11See the ICAPE associates (www.icape.org) for a much longer list. 
12See the charter of the International Confederation of Associations for 
Pluralism in Economics (www.icape.org). All eight traditional 
approaches identified above are represented in ICAPE. Many 
post-Keynesians and neo-Ricardians, however, accept the 
dominance view. 
13Tesfatsion, for example, asserts that the term agent 'refers broadly 
to bundled data and behavioural methods representing an entity 
constituting part of a computationally constructed world. 
Examples of possible agents include individuals (e.g. consumers, 
workers), social groupings (e.g. families, firms, government 
agencies), institutions (e.g. markets, regulatory systems), 
biological entities (e.g. crops livestock, forests) and physical 
entities (e.g. infrastructure, weather, geographical regions) 
(Tesfatsion, 2005, p. 6). 
14Indeed, Smith largely packs evolutionary arguments into the past by 
employing arguments from evolutionary psychology to explain 
individuals' current choice behaviour as an outcome of evolution 
rather than part of an on-going evolutionary process (Smith, 
2003). 
 
